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ABSTRACT
Embeddings are functions thatmap raw input data to low-dimensional
vector representations, while preserving important semantic in-
formation about the inputs. Pre-training embeddings on a large
amount of unlabeled data and fine-tuning them for downstream
tasks is now a de facto standard in achieving state of the art learning
in many domains.
We demonstrate that embeddings, in addition to encoding generic
semantics, often also present a vector that leaks sensitive informa-
tion about the input data. We develop three classes of attacks to
systematically study information that might be leaked by embed-
dings. First, embedding vectors can be inverted to partially recover
some of the input data. As an example, we show that our attacks
on popular sentence embeddings recover between 50%–70% of the
input words (F1 scores of 0.5–0.7). Second, embeddings may reveal
sensitive attributes inherent in inputs and independent of the un-
derlying semantic task at hand. Attributes such as authorship of
text can be easily extracted by training an inference model on just
a handful of labeled embedding vectors. Third, embedding models
leak moderate amount of membership information for infrequent
training data inputs. We extensively evaluate our attacks on vari-
ous state-of-the-art embedding models in the text domain. We also
propose and evaluate defenses that can prevent the leakage to some
extent at a minor cost in utility.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) has seen an explosive growth over the past
decade and is now widely used across industry from image anal-
ysis [24, 34], speech recognition [22], and even in applications in
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the medical sciences for diagnosis [8, 56]. These advances rely on
not only improved training algorithms and architectures, but also
access to high-quality and often sensitive data. The wide applica-
tions of machine learning and its reliance on quality training data
necessitates a better understanding of how exactly MLmodels work
and how they interact with their training data. Naturally, there is
increasing literature focused on these aspects, both in the domains
of interpretability and fairness of models, and their privacy. The
latter is further of timely importance given recent regulations under
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
umbrella requiring users to have greater control of their data.
Applying a line of research investigating whether individual
genomic records can be subsequently identified [28, 62], Shokri et
al. [66] developed the first membership inference tests investigating
how ML models may leak some of their training data. This subse-
quently led to a large body of work exploring this space [45, 48,
60, 61, 77]. Another research direction investigating how models
might memorize their training data has also shown promising re-
sults [4, 67]. Apart from training data privacy, modern deep learning
models can unintentionally leak information of the sensitive input
from the model’s representation at inference time [9, 18, 38, 50, 68].
This growing body of work analyzing models from the stand-
point of privacy aims to answer natural questions: Besides the learn-
ing task at hand, what other information do models capture or expose
about their training data? And, what functionalities may be captured
by ML models unintentionally? We also note that beyond the scope
of this paper are other rich sets of questions around adversarial
behavior with ML models—the presence of adversarial examples,
data poisoning attacks, and more.
Embeddings. In most of the research investigating the privacy
of ML models, one class of models is largely conspicuously absent.
Embeddings are mathematical functions that map raw objects (such
as words, sentences, images, user activities) to real valued vectors
with the goal of capturing and preserving some important semantic
meaning about the underlying objects. The most common appli-
cation of embeddings is transfer learning where the embeddings
are pre-trained on a large amount of unlabeled raw data and later
fine-tuned on downstream tasks with limited labeled data. Transfer
learning from embeddings have been shown to be tremendously
useful for many natural language processing (NLP) tasks such as
paraphrasing [14], response suggestion [30], information retrieval,
text classification, and question answering [57], where labeled data
is typically expensive to collect. Embeddings have also been success-
fully applied to other data domains including social networks [21],
source code [2], YouTube watches [11], movie feedback [25], lo-
cations [12], etc. In some sense, their widespread use should not
be surprising—embedding models and their success illustrate why
deep learning has been successful at capturing interesting semantics
from large quantities of raw data.
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Embedding models are often pre-trained on raw and unlabeled
data at hand, then used with labeled data to transfer learning to
various downstream tasks. Our study of embeddings is motivated
by their widespread application and trying to better understand
how these two stages of training may capture and subsequently
leak information about sensitive data. While it is attractive that
these models inherently capture relations and similarities and other
semantic relationships between raw objects like words or sentences,
it also behooves one to consider if this is all the information being
captured by the embeddings. Do they, perhaps, in addition to mean-
ing of words inadvertently capture information about the authors
perhaps? Would that have consequences if these embeddings are
used in adversarial ways? What aspects of the seminal research
into privacy of ML models through the lens of membership infer-
ence attacks and memorization propensity can we apply to better
understand the privacy risks of embeddings?
These questions and more lead us to initiate a systematic study
of the privacy of embedding models by considering three broad
classes of attacks. We first consider embedding inversion attacks
whose goal is to invert a given embedding back to the sensitive
raw text inputs (such as private user messages). For embeddings
susceptible to these attacks, it is imperative that we consider the
embedding outputs containing inherently as much information
with respect to risks of leakage as the underlying sensitive data
itself. The fact that embeddings appear to be abstract real-numbered
vectors should not be misconstrued as being safe.
Along the lines of Song and Shmatikov [68], we consider at-
tribute inference attacks to test if embeddings might unintentionally
reveal attributes of their input data that are sensitive; aspects that
are not useful for their downstream applications. This threat model
is particularly important when sensitive attributes orthogonal to
downstream tasks are quickly revealed given very little auxiliary
data, something that the adversary might be able to capture through
external means. As an example, given (sensitive) demographic in-
formation (such as gender) that an adversary might retrieve for a
limited set of data points, the embeddings should ideally not en-
able even somewhat accurate estimates of these sensitive attributes
across a larger population on which they might be used for com-
pletely orthogonal downstream tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis).
Finally, we also consider classic membership inference attacks
demonstrating the need to worry about leakage of training data
membership when given access to embedding models and their
outputs, as is common with many other ML models.
Our Contributions. As discussed above, we initiate a systematic
and broad study of three classes of potential information leak-
age in embedding models. We consider word and sentence em-
bedding models to show the viability of these attacks and demon-
strate their usefulness in improving our understanding of privacy
risks of embeddings. Additionally, we introduce new techniques
to attacks models, in addition to drawing inspiration from exist-
ing attacks to apply them to embeddings to various degrees. Our
results are demonstrated on widely-used word embeddings such
as Word2Vec [46], FastText [3], GloVe [54] and different sentence
embedding models including dual-encoders [39] and BERT [13, 35].
(1) We demonstrate that sentence embedding vectors encode
information about the exact words in input texts rather than merely
abstract semantics. Under scenarios involving black-box and white-
box access to embedding models, we develop several inversion
techniques that can invert the embeddings back to the words with
high precision and recall values (exceeding 60% each) demonstrating
that a significant fraction of the inputs may be easily recovered. We
note that these techniques might be of independent interest.
(2)We discover certain embeddings training frameworks in par-
ticular favor sensitive attributes leakage by showing that such em-
bedding models improve upon state-of-the-art stylometry tech-
niques [59, 65] to infer text authorship with very little training
data. Using dual encoder embeddings [39] trained with contrastive
learning framework [63] and 10 to 50 labeled sentences per author,
we show 1.5–3× fold improvement in classifying hundreds of au-
thors over prior stylometry methods and embeddings trained with
different learning paradigms.
(3)We show that membership inference attacks are still a viable
threat for embedding models, albeit to a lesser extent. Given our
results that demonstrate adversary can achieve a 30% improvement
on membership information over random guessing on both word
and sentence embeddings, we show that is prudent to consider
these potential avenues of leakage when dealing with embeddings.
(4) Finally, we propose and evaluate adversarial training tech-
niques to minimize the information leakage via inversion and sensi-
tive attribute inference. We demonstrate through experiments their
applicability to mitigating these attacks. We show that embedding
inversion attacks and attribute inference attacks against our adver-
sarially trained model go down by 30% and 80% respectively. These
come at a minor cost to utility indicating a mitigation that cannot
simply be attributed to training poorer embeddings.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 introduces preliminaries needed for the rest of
the paper. Sections 3, 4, and 5 cover attacks against embedding
models—inversion attacks, sensitive attributes inference attacks,
and membership inference attacks respectively. Our experimen-
tal results and proposed defenses are covered in Sections 6 and 7
respectively, followed by related work and conclusions.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Embedding Models
Embedding models are widely used machine learning models that
map a raw input (usually discrete) to a low-dimensional vector.
The embedding vector captures the semantic meaning of the raw
input data and can be used for various downstream tasks including
nearest neighbor search, retrieval, and classification. In this work,
we focus on embeddings of text input data as they are widely used
in many applications and have been studied extensively in research
community [3, 5, 13, 33, 35, 39, 46, 54, 55, 58].
Word embeddings. Word embeddings are look-up tables that
map each wordw from a vocabularyV to a vectorvw ∈ Rd . Word
embedding vectors capture the semantic meaning of words in the
following manner: words with similar meanings will have small
cosine distance in the embedding space, the cosine distance ofv1
andv2 defined as 1 − (v⊤1 ·v2/∥v1∥∥v2∥).
Popular word embedding models including Word2Vec [46], Fast-
Text [3] and GloVe [54] are learned in an unsupervised fashion on
a large unlabeled corpus. In detail, given a sliding window of words
C = [wb , ... ,w0, ... ,we ] from the training corpus, Word2Vec and
FastText train to predict the context wordwi given the center word
w0 by maximizing the log-likelihood log PV (wi |w0) where
PV (wi |w0) =
exp(v⊤wi ·vw0 )∑
w ∈{wi }∪Vneg exp(v⊤w ·vw0 )
(1)
for eachwi ∈ C/{w0}. To accelerate training, the above probability
is calculated againstVneg ⊂ V , a sampled subset of words not in
C instead of the entire vocabulary. GloVe is trained to estimate the
co-occurrence count ofwi andw j for all pairs ofwi ,w j ∈ C.
A common practice in modern deep NLP models is to use word
embeddings as the first layer so that discrete inputs are mapped
to a continuous space and can be used for later computation. Pre-
trained word embeddings is often used to initialize the weights
of the embedding layer. This is especially helpful when the down-
stream NLP tasks have a limited amount of labeled data as the
knowledge learned by these pre-trained word embeddings from a
large unlabeled corpus can be transferred to the downstream tasks.
Sentence embeddings. Sentence embeddings are functions that
map a variable-length sequence of words x to a fix-sized embed-
ding vector Φ(x) ∈ Rd through a neural network model Φ. For a
input sequence of ℓ words x = [w1,w2, ... ,wℓ], Φ first maps x into
a sequence of word vectors X = [v1, ... ,vℓ] with a word embed-
ding matrix V . Then Φ feeds X to a recurrent neural networks or
Transformer [70] and obtain a sequential hidden representation
[h1,h2, ... ,hℓ] for each word in x . Finally Φ outputs the sentence
embedding by reducing the sequential hidden representation to a
single vector representation. Common reducing methods include
taking the last representation where Φ(x) = hℓ and mean-pooling
where Φ(x) = (1/ℓ) ·∑ℓi=1 hi .
Sentence embedding models are usually trained with unsuper-
vised learningmethods on a large unlabeled corpus. A popular archi-
tecture for unsupervised sentence embedding is the dual-encoder
model proposed in many prior works [5, 7, 26, 39, 40, 58, 75]. The
dual-encoder model trains on a pair of context sentences (xa ,xb )
where the pair could be a sentence and its next sentence in the
same text or a dialog input and its response, etc. Given a randomly
sampled set of negative sentencesXneg that are not in the context of
xa ,xb , the objective of training is to maximizes the log-likelihood
log PΦ(xb |xa ,Xneg) where
PΦ(xb |xa ,Xneg) =
exp(Φ(xb )⊤ · Φ(xa ))∑
x ∈{xb }∪Xneg exp(Φ(x)⊤ · Φ(xa ))
. (2)
Intuitively, the model is trained to predict the correct context xb
from the set {xb } ∪ Xneg when conditioned on xa . In other words,
the similarity between embeddings of context data is maximized
while that between negative samples is minimized.
Sentence embeddings usually outperform word embeddings on
transfer learning. For downstream tasks such as image-sentence
retrieval, classification, and paraphrase detection, sentence embed-
dings are much more efficient for the reason that only a linear
model needs to be trained using embeddings as the feature vectors.
Pre-trained language models. Language models are trained to
learn contextual information by predicting next words in input text,
and pre-trained language models can easily adopt to other NLP
tasks by fine-tuning. The recently proposed Transformer architec-
ture [70] enables language models to have dozen of layers with
huge capacity. These large language models, including BERT [13],
GPT-2 [55], and XLNet [76], are trained on enormous large corpus
and have shown impressive performance gains when transferred
to other downstream NLP tasks in comparison to previous state of
the art methods.
These pre-trained language models can also be used to extract
sentence embeddings. There are many different ways to extract
sentence-level features with pre-trained language models. In this
work, we follow Sentence-BERT [58] which suggests that mean-
pooling on the hidden representations yields best empirical perfor-
mance.
2.2 Threat Model and Attack Taxonomy
In this section, we give an overview of threat models we consider in
this paper and describe a taxonomy of attacks leaking information
from embedding models. Figure 1 shows an overview of the attack
taxonomy.
In many NLP applications, embedding vectors are often com-
puted on sensitive user input. Although existing frameworks pro-
pose computing embeddings locally on user’s device to protect the
privacy of the raw data [6, 36, 50, 71], the embeddings themselves
are shared with machine learning service providers or other parties
for downstream tasks (training or inference). It is often tempting
to assume that sharing embeddings might be “safer” than sharing
the raw data, by their nature of being “simply a vector of real num-
bers.” However, this ignores the information that is retained in, and
may be extracted from embeddings. We investigate the following
questions: What kinds of sensitive information about the inputs are
encoded in the embeddings? And can an adversary with access to the
embeddings extract the encoded sensitive information?
Threat model. Our threat model comprises the following en-
tities. (1) Dtrain is a training dataset that may contain sensitive
information. (2) Φ, the embedding model, which might be avail-
able in a white-box or black-box fashion. White-box access to the
model reveals the model architecture and all parameters. Black-
box access allows anyone to compute Φ(x) for x of their choice.
(3) Etarget = {Φ(x∗i )}, a set of embedding vectors on sensitive in-
puts x∗i . (4) Daux is an auxiliary dataset available to the adversary
comprising of either limited labeled data drawn from the same dis-
tribution as Dtrain or unlabeled raw text data. In the text domain,
unlabeled data is cheap to collect due to the enormous amount free
text available on the Internet while labeling them is often much
more expensive.
An adversary, given access to some of the entities described
above, aims to leak some sensitive information about the input x
from the embedding vector Φ(x). By looking at variants of what
information an adversary possesses and their target, we arrive at
three broad classes of attacks against embeddings.
With sensitive input data such as personal messages, it is natural
to consider an adversary whose goal is to (partially) recover this
text from Φ(x). Even if the input data is not sensitive, they may
be associated with sensitive attributes, and an adversary could be
tasked with learning these attributes from Φ(x). And finally, rather
than recovering inputs, the adversary given some information about
Figure 1: Taxonomy of attacks against embedding models. We assume adversary has access to the embedding Φ(x∗) of a sen-
sitive input text x∗ that will be used for downstream NLP tasks, and perform three information leakage attacks on Φ(x∗): (1)
inverting the embedding back to the exact words in x∗, (2) inferring sensitive attribute of x∗, and (3) inferring themembership,
i.e. whether x∗ and its context x ′ has been used for training.
Φ(x) can aim to find if x was used to train Φ or not. These are
formalized below.
Embedding inversion attacks. In this threat model, the adver-
sary’s goal is to invert a target embedding Φ(x∗) and recover words
in x∗. We consider attacks that involve both black-box and white-
box access toΦ. The adversary is also allowed access to an unlabeled
Daux and in both scenarios is able to evaluate Φ(x) for x ∈ Daux.
Sensitive attribute inference attacks. In this threat model, the
adversary’s goal is to infer sensitive attribute s∗ of a secret input
x∗ from a target embedding Φ(x∗). We assume the adversary has
access to Φ, and a set of labeled data of the form (x , s) for x ∈
Daux. We focus on discrete attributes s∗ ∈ S, where S is the set
of all possible attribute classes, and an adversary performing the
inference by learning a classifier f onDaux. Given sufficient labeled
data , the adversary’s task trivially reduces to plain supervised
learning, which would rightly not be seen as adversarial. Therefore,
the more interesting scenario, which is the focus of this paper, is
when the adversary is given access to a very small set of labeled data
(in the order of 10–50 per class) where transfer learning from Φ(x)
is likely to outperform supervised learning directly from inputs x .
Membership inference attacks. Membership inference against
ML models are well-studied attacks where the adversary has a
target data point x∗ and the goal is to figure out with good accu-
racy whether x∗ ∈ Dtrain or not. Unlike previous attacks focused
on supervised learning, some embedding models, such as word
embeddings, allow you to trivially infer membership. For word
embeddings, every member of a vocabulary set is necessarily part
of Dtrain. Instead, we expand the definition of training data mem-
bership to consider this data with their contexts, which is used in
training. We assume the adversary has a target context of word
[w∗1 , ... ,w∗n ] and access to V for word embedding, or a context of
target sentences (x∗a ,x∗b ) and access to the model Φ for sentence
embedding, and the goal is to decide the membership for the con-
text. We also consider the target to be an aggregated level of data
sentences [x∗1 , ... ,x∗n ] comprising multiple contexts for the adver-
sary to determine if it were part of training Φ. Membership privacy
for aggregation in the user level has also been explored in prior
works [44, 67].
We further assume adversary has a limited Daux labeled with
membership. We propose that this is a reasonable and practical
assumption as training data for text embeddings are often collected
from the Internet where an adversary can easily inject data or get
access to small amounts of labeled data through a more expen-
sive labeling process. The assumption also holds for adversarial
participants in collaborative training or federated learning [43, 44].
3 EMBEDDING INVERSION ATTACKS
The goal of inverting text embeddings is to recover the target input
textsx∗ from the embedding vectorsΦ(x∗) and access toΦ.We focus
on inverting embeddings of short texts and for practical reasons, it
suffices to analyze the privacy of the inputs by considering attacks
that recover a set of words without recovering the word ordering.
We leave open the problem of recovering exact sequences and one
promising direction involves language modeling [64].
A naïve approach for inversion would be enumerating all pos-
sible sequences from the vocabulary and find the recovery xˆ such
that Φ(xˆ) = Φ(x∗). Although such brute-force search only requires
black-box access to Φ, the search space grows exponentially with
the length of x and thus inverting by enumerating is computation-
ally infeasible.
The brute-force approach does not capture inherently what in-
formation might be leaked by Φ itself. This naturally raises the
question of what attacks are possible if the adversary is given com-
plete access to the parameters and architecture of Φ, i.e., white-box
access. This also motivates a relaxation technique for optimization-
based attacks in Section 3.1. We also consider the more constrained
black-box access scenario in Section 3.2 where we develop learning
based attacks that are much more efficient than exhaustive search
by utilizing auxiliary data.
3.1 White-box Inversion
In a white-box scenario, we assume that the adversary has access
to the embedding model Φ’s parameters and architecture. We for-
mulate white-box inversion as the following optimization problem:
min
xˆ ∈X(V)
| |Φ(xˆ) − Φ(x∗)| |22 (3)
where X(V) is the set of all possible sequences enumerated from
the vocabulary V . The above optimization can be hard to solve
Algorithm 1White-box inversion
1: Input: target embedding Φ(x∗), white-box embedding model
Φ with lower layer representation function Ψ, temperature T ,
sparsity threshold τsp, auxiliary dataset Daux
2: Query function Φ and Ψ with Daux and collect
{(Φ(xi ),Ψ(xi ))|xi ∈ Daux}.
3: Train a linear mappingM by minimizing | |M(Φ(xi )) − Ψ(xi )| |22
on {(Φ(xi ),Ψ(xi ))}i .
4: if Ψ is mean-pooling on word embedding V of Φ then
5: Initialize z ∈ R |V |
6: while objective function of Eq 7 not converged do
7: Update z with gradient of Eq 7.
8: Project z to non-negative orthant.
9: return xˆ = {wi |zi ≥ τsp} |V |i=1
10: else
11: Initialize Z = [z1, ... ,zℓ] ∈ Rℓ×|V |
12: while objective function of Eq 6 not converged do
13: Update Z with gradient of Eq 6.
14: return xˆ = {wi |i = argmaxzj }ℓj=1
directly due to the discrete input space. Inspired by prior work
on relaxing categorical variables [29], we propose a continuous
relaxation of the sequential word input that allows more efficient
optimization based on gradients.
The goal of the discrete optimization in Equation 3 is to select
a sequence of words such that the distance between the output
embeddings is minimized. We relax the word selection at each
position of the sequence with a continuous variable zi ∈ R |V | .
As mentioned before, Φ first maps the input x of length ℓ into a
sequence of word vectors X = [v1, ... ,vℓ] and then computes the
text embedding based on X . For optimizing zi , we represent the
selected word vectors vˆi using a softmax attention mechanism:
vˆi = V
⊤ · softmax(zi/T ) for i = 1, ... , ℓ (4)
where V is the word embedding matrix in Φ and T is a tempera-
ture parameter. The softmax function approximates hard argmax
selection for T < 1. Intuitively, softmax(zi/T ) models the probabil-
ities of selecting each word in the vocabulary at position i in the
sequence and vˆi is the average of all word vectors weighted by the
probabilities.
Let Z = [z1, ... ,zℓ] ∈ Rℓ×|V | and relaxed(Z ,T ) = [vˆ1, ... , vˆℓ]
be the sequence of softmax relaxed word vectors. For simplicity, we
denote Φ(X ) as the text embedding computed from any sequence
of word vectors X . Then our relaxed optimization problem is:
min
Z
| |Φ(relaxed(Z ,T )) − Φ(x∗)| |22 . (5)
With continuous relaxation and white-box access to Φ, the opti-
mization problem can now be solved by gradient-based methods as
gradients ofZ can be calculated using back-propagation. To recover,
we compute xˆ = {wi |i = argmaxzj }ℓj=1.
Inverting embedding from deep models. Prior works [15, 16,
41, 69] demonstrated that inverting image features from the higher
layers of deep model can be challenging as representations from the
higher layers are more abstract and generic while inverting from
lower-layer representations results in better reconstruction of the
image. With the recent advance in Transformer models [70], text
embeddings can also be computed from deep models with many
layers such as BERT [13]. Directly inverting such deep embeddings
using the relaxed optimization method in Equation 5 can results in
inaccurate recovery as the optimization becomes highly non-convex
and different sequences with similar semantics can be mapped to
the same location in the high-level embedding space. In reality,
however, it is more common to use the embeddings from the higher
layers than from lower layers for downstream tasks and thus an
adversary might not be able to observe embeddings from lower
layers at all.
To resolve this issue, we propose to invert in two stages: (1) the
adversary first maps the observed higher layer embedding Φ(x)
to a lower layer one with a learned mapping function M , and (2)
the adversary then solves the optimization problem of minimizing
| |Ψ(xˆ) −M(Φ(x∗))| |22 where Ψ denotes the lower layer embedding
function. To learn the mapping functionM , adversary queries the
white-box embedding model to get (Φ(xi ),Ψ(xi )) for each auxiliary
data xi ∈ Daux and trains M with the set {(Φ(xi ),Ψ(xi ))}i . After
M is trained, adversary solve the relaxed optimization:
min
Z
| |Ψ(relaxed(Z ,T )) −M(Φ(x∗))| |22 (6)
In practice, we find that learning a linear least square model asM
works reasonably well.
A special case of inverting lowest representation. The lowest
embedding we can compute from the text embedding models would
be the average of the word vectors, i.e., Ψ(x) = (1/ℓ) ·∑ℓi=1vi . In-
verting from such embedding reduces to the problem of recovering
the exact words vectors with given averaged vector. Instead of using
the relaxed optimization approach in Equation 5, we use a sparse
coding [49] formulation as following:
min
z ∈R|V|≥0
| |V⊤ · z −M(Φ(x∗))| |22 + λsp | |z | |1 (7)
whereV is the word embedding matrix and the variable z quantifies
the contribution of each word vector to the average. We constrain z
to be non-negative as a word contributes either something positive
if it is in the sequence x or zero if it is not in x . We further penalize
z with L1 norm to ensure its sparsity as only few words from the
vocabulary contributed to the average. The above optimization can
be solved efficiently with projected gradient descent, where we set
the coordinate zj to 0 if zj < 0 after each descent step. The final
recovered words are those with coefficient zj > τsp for a sparsity
threshold hyper-parameter τsp.
3.2 Black-box Inversion
In the black-box scenario, we assume that the adversary only has
query access to the embedding model Φ, i.e., adversary observes the
output embedding Φ(x) for a query x . Gradient-based optimization
is not applicable as the adversary does not have access to the model
parameters and thus the gradients.
Instead of searching for the most likely input, we directly ex-
tract the input information retained in the target embedding by
formulating a learning problem. The adversary learns an inversion
model ϒ that takes a text embedding Φ(x) as input and outputs the
set of words in the sequence x . As mentioned before, our goal is
to recover the set of words in the input independent of their word
ordering. We denote W(x) as the set of words in the sequence
x . The adversary utilizes the auxiliary dataset Daux and queries
the black-box Φ and obtain a collection of (Φ(x),W(x)) for each
x ∈ Daux. The adversary then trains the inversion model ϒ to
maximize log Pϒ(W(x)|Φ(x)) on the collected set of (Φ(x),W(x))
values. Once ϒ is trained, the adversary predicts the words in the
target sequence x∗ as ϒ(Φ(x∗)) for an observed Φ(x∗).
Multi-label classification. The goal is to predict the set of words
in sequence x given the embedding Φ(x). A common choice for
such a goal is to build a multi-label classification (MLC) model,
where the model assigns a binary label of whether a word is in the
set for each word in the vocabulary. The training objective function
is then:
LMLC = −
∑
w ∈V
[yw log(yˆw ) + (1 − yw ) log(1 − yˆw )] (8)
where yˆw = Pϒ(yw |Φ(x)) is the predicted probability of word w
given ϒ conditioned on Φ(x) and yw = 1 if word w is in x and 0
otherwise.
Multi-set prediction. One drawback in the above multi-label
classification model is that the model predicts the appearance of
each word independently. A more sophisticated formulation would
be predicting the next word given the current predicted set of
words until all words in the set are predicted. We adopt the multi-
set prediction loss [72] (MSP) that is suited for the formulation. Our
MSP model trains a recurrent neural network that predicts the next
word in the set conditioned on the embedding Φ(x) and current
predicted set of words. The training objective is as follows:
LMSP =
ℓ∑
i=1
1
|Wi |
∑
w ∈Wi
− log Pϒ(w |W<i ,Φ(x)) (9)
where Wi is the set of words left to predict at timestamp i and
W<i is the set of the predicted words before i . The MSP formula-
tion allows ϒ to learn a policy on the order of the words should be
predicted instead of predicting all words independently and simulta-
neously. In Section 6.2, we empirically show that MSP outperforms
MLC in terms of the precision-recall trade-off.
4 ATTRIBUTE INFERENCE ATTACKS
Embeddings are designed to encode rich semantic information
about the input data. When the input data is user-related, e.g., a
user’s video watch history, the embedding vector naturally captures
information about the user and is oftenmuchmore informative than
the raw input. Although in many applications such rich information
from the embeddings is desired in order to provide personalized
services to the user, the embeddingsmay potentially reveal sensitive
information about the input that might not directly appear in or be
easy to infer from the input. As a motivating example, consider an
adversary that may curate a small set of public comments labeled
with authors of interest and then planning to use semantically
rich embeddings on unlabeled, targeted text fragments to aim to
deanonymize the author of the text. This is also the typical setup
in stylometry research [59, 65] that we make more realistic by
considering the challenges of curating labeled data (which may be a
Algorithm 2 Black-box Inversion with multi-set prediction
1: Input: target embedding Φ(x∗), black-box model Φ, auxiliary
data Daux
2: procedureMSPLoss(x ,Φ, ϒ)
3: Initialize L ← 0,Wi ←W(x),W<i ← ∅
4: for i = 1 to ℓ do
5: Predict a word wˆ = argmax Pϒ(w |W<i ,Φ(x)).
6: Wi ←Wi/{wˆ} andW<i ←W<i ∪ {wˆ}.
7: L ← L − 1|Wi |
∑
w ∈Wi log Pϒ(w |W<i ,Φ(x)).
8: return L
9: Initialize ϒ as a recurrent neural network.
10: while ϒ not converged do
11: Sample a batch B ⊂ Daux.
12: Compute LMSP ← 1|B |
∑
xi ∈B MSPLoss(xi ,Φ, ϒ).
13: Update ϒ with ∇LMSP.
14: return xˆ = {argmax Pϒ(w |W< i,Φ(x∗))}ℓi=1
Algorithm 3 Sensitive attribute inference
1: Input: target embedding Φ(x∗), black-box model Φ, labeled
auxiliary data Daux
2: Query Φ with Daux and collect {(Φ(xi ), si )|xi ∈ Daux}.
3: Train a classifier f that predicts s on {(Φ(xi ), si )}.
4: return sˆ = f (Φ(x∗))
costly process) and strictly limiting the number of labeled examples
the adversary has to work with.
For inferring sensitive attributes, we assume that the adversary
has a limited set Daux = {(Φ(xi ), si )}i of embeddings labeled with
the sensitive attribute, such as text authorship. The adversary then
treats the inference problem as a downstream task and trains a
classifier which predicts s given Φ(x) as inputs on Daux. At in-
ference time, adversary simply applies the classifier on observed
embedding Φ(x∗) to infer the sensitive attribute of x∗. We focus on
the scenario of the adversary only having limited labeled data so
as to (a) closely match real scenarios where labeled sensitive data
would be challenging to collect, and (b) demonstrate how easily
sensitive information can be extracted from the embeddings which
therefore constitutes an important vector of information leakage
from embeddings.
Connections between leakage and the objective. In supervised
learning, deep representations can reveal sensitive attributes of the
input as these attributes might be used as internal features for the
learning task [68]. The connection between unsupervised learning
tasks and the leakage of sensitive attributes is less well under-
stood. The objective functions (Equation 1 and 2) that maximize
the semantic similarity of data in context for training unsupervised
dual-encoder embedding models fall into contrastive learning frame-
work [63]. This framework theoretically explains how unsupervised
embedding training helps with the downstream tasks with a utility
perspective. We explore how it might also favor the inference of
some sensitive attributes from the perspective ofprivacy.
In this framework, training data of the embedding models are
associated with latent classes (e.g., authors of the texts). When
Algorithm 4MIA on word embeddings
1: Input: target window of words C = [wb , ... ,w0, ... ,we ], word
embedding matrix V , similarity function δ
2: Map words in C with V and get [vwb , ... ,vw0 , ... ,vwe ].
3: ∆← {δi |δi = δ (vw0 ,vwi ),∀wi ∈ C/{w0}}.
4: return “member” if 1|∆ |
∑
δi ∈∆ δi ≥ τm else “non-member”
training with contrastive loss, the embeddings are learned so as to
be similar for data in the same context and to be dissimilar for data
coming from negative samples. Our approach takes advantage of
the fact that data sharing the same latent class will often appear in
the same context. Therefore, embedding similarity will be closer
for inputs from the same class, and consequently with the same
sensitive attribute when there is a correlation. We further note
that unsupervised embeddings are especially helpful for attribute
inference under the limited data constraints as the embeddings are
trained on much larger unlabeled data which allows them to learn
semantic similarity over latent classes that might not be captured
only given limited labeled data.
5 MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
Both inverting embeddings and inferring sensitive attributes con-
cern inference-time input privacy, i.e., information leaked about
the input x from the embedding vector. Another important aspect
of privacy of ML models is training data privacy, namely, what
information about the training data (which might be potentially
sensitive) is leaked by a model during the training process? We
focus on membership inference attacks [66] as a measurement of
training data leakage in the embedding models.
The goal of membership inference is to infer whether a data point
is in the training set of a given machine learning model. Classic
membership inference attacks mainly target supervised machine
learning, where a data point consists of a input feature vector and a
class label. For unsupervised embedding models trained on units of
data in context, we thus wish to infer the membership of a context
of data (e.g., a sliding window of words or a pair of sentences).
5.1 Word Embeddings
Prior works [60, 77] on membership inference suggest that sim-
ple thresholding attacks based on loss values can be theoretically
optimal under certain assumptions and practically competitive to
more sophisticated attacks [66]. In embedding models, the loss is
approximated based on sampling during training as described in
Section 2 and computing exact loss is inefficient. We thus develop
simple and efficient thresholding attacks based on similarity scores
instead of loss values.
Word embeddings are trained on a slidingwindow ofwords in the
training corpus. To decide the membership for a window of words
C = [wb , ... ,w0, ... ,we ], the adversary first converts each word
into its embedding vectors [vwb , ... ,vw0 , ... ,vwe ]. Then the adver-
sary computes a set of similarity scores ∆ = {δ (vw0 ,vwi )|∀wi ∈
C/{w0}}, where δ is a vector similarity measure function (e.g. co-
sine similarity). Finally, the adversary uses the averaged score in ∆
Algorithm 5 Aggregated-level MIA on sentence embeddings
1: Input: target sentences in context X = [x1, ... ,xn ], sentence
embedding model Φ, similarity function δ , auxiliary data Daux
with membership labels
2: Map sentences in X with Φ and get [Φ(x1), ... ,Φ(xn )].
3: if learning similarity function then
4: Initialize similarity function δ ′ with projectionWm .
5: while δ ′ not converged do
6: Sample a batch B ⊂ Daux.
7: Compute loss LMIA for (xa ,xb ) ∈ B with Eq 10.
8: UpdateWm with ∇LMIA.
9: Replace similarity function δ ← δ ′.
10: ∆← {δi |δi = δ (Φ(xi ),Φ(xi+1))}n−1i=1 .
11: return “member” if 1|∆ |
∑
δi ∈∆ δi ≥ τm else “non-member”
to decide membership: if the averaged score is above some thresh-
old then C is a member of the training data and not a member
otherwise.
5.2 Sentence Embeddings
In sentence embeddings, we wish to decide membership of a pair
of sentence in context (xa ,xb ). We simply use the similarity score
δ (Φ(xa ),Φ(xb )) as the decision score for membership inference as
sentences in context used for training will be more similar to each
other than sentences which were not used for training.
Aggregate-level membership inference. Sometimes, deciding
membership of a pair of sentences might not be enough to cause
a real privacy threat. In many user-centric applications, models
are trained on aggregation of data from users; e.g., a keyboard
prediction model is trained on users’ input logs on their phone [44].
In this scenario, the adversary infers membership on aggregate
data from a particular user to learn whether this user participated
training or not.
To perform MIA on aggregate text of n sentences X = [x1,x2,
... ,xn ], the adversary first gets each sentence embeddings [Φ(x1),
Φ(x2), ... ,Φ(xn )]. Then the adversary collects the set of similarity
score ∆ = {δ (xi ,xi+1)}n−1i=1 . Finally, similar to MIA against word
embeddings, we use the average score in ∆ as the decision score
for membership inference.
Learned similarity metric function. Using a pre-defined simi-
larity measure may not achieve best membership inference results.
With auxiliary data labeled with membership information, an ad-
versary can learn a similarity metric customized for inference mem-
bership. More specifically, they learn a projection matrixWm and
computes the learned similarity as δ ′(xa ,xb ) = δ (W ⊤m ·Φ(xa ),W ⊤m ·
Φ(xb )). The attack optimizes the binary cross-entropy loss with
membership labels as following:
LMIA = −[ym log(δ ′a,b ) + (1 − ym ) log(1 − δ ′a,b )] (10)
where δ ′a,b = δ
′(xa ,xb ) andym = 1 if (xa ,xb )where in the training
set and 0 otherwise.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
6.1 Embedding Models and Datasets
As each of the attacks assess different perspectives of privacy, we
evaluate them on different text embedding models that are either
trained locally on consumer hardware or are trained elsewhere
and public available. Here, we describe text embedding models
(and their corresponding datasets) we trained locally and evaluated
against attacks described in previous sections. Other public models
and datasets are detailed in subsequent subsections.
Word Embeddings on Wikipedia. We collected nearly 150,000
Wikipedia articles [42] for evaluating word embeddings. We locally
trained Word2Vec [46], FastText [3], and GloVe [54] embedding
models using half of the articles and use the other half for evaluating
membership inference.
For all word embeddings, we set the number of dimension in
embedding vector d to be 100. For Word2Vec and FastText, we set
the number of sampled negative words |Vneg | to be 25, learning
rate to be 0.05, sliding window size to be 5 and number of training
epochs to be 5. For GloVe, we set the number of training iterations
to be 50 as suggested in the original paper [54].
Sentence Embeddings on BookCorpus. Following prior works
on training unsupervised sentence embeddings [33, 39], we col-
lected sentences from BookCorpus [79] consists of 14,000 books.
We sample 40 millions sentences from half of the books as training
data and use the rest as held-out data.
We locally train sentence embedding models with dual-encoder
architecture described in Section 2. We considered two different
neural network architecture for the embedding models: a recurrent
neural network (LSTM [27]) and a three-layer Transformer [70].
For the LSTM, we set the size of embedding dimension d to be 1,200,
number of training epochs to be 1 and learning rate to be 0.0005
following previous implementation [39]. For the Transformer, we
set d to be 600, number of training epochs to be 5 with a warm-up
scheduled learning rate following [70]. For both architectures, we
train the model with Adam optimizer [32] and set the negative
samples Xneg as the other sentences in the same training batch at
each step and |Xneg | = 800.
6.2 Embedding Inversion
Target and auxiliary data. We randomly sample 100,000 sen-
tences from 800 authors in the held-out BookCorpus data as the
target data Dtarget = {x∗i } to be recovered and perform inversion
on the set of embeddings Etarget = {Φ(x∗i )}. We consider two types
of auxiliary data Daux: same-domain and cross-domain data. For
same-domain Daux, we use a set of 200,000 randomly sampled
sentences from BookCorpus that is disjoint to Dtarget. For cross-
domain Daux, we use a set of 800,000 randomly sampled sentences
from Wikipedia articles. We set the number of cross-domain data
points to be more than the same-domain data to match real-world
constraints where cross-domain data is typically public and cheap
to collect.
Additional embedding models. In addition to the two dual-
encoder embeddingmodels with LSTM and Transformer, we further
experiment with popular pre-trained language models for sentence
Table 1: White-box inversion results on sentence embed-
dings. Pre denotes precision andRec denotes recall.We leave
the cross-domain results for Equation 5 as blank as no learn-
ing on auxiliary data is needed. The best results are in bold.
Same domain Cross domain
Equation 5 Pre Rec F1 Pre Rec F1
LSTM 56.93 56.54 56.74 - - -
Transformer 35.74 35.44 35.59 - - -
BERT 0.84 0.89 0.87 - - -
ALBERT 3.36 2.95 3.14 - - -
Equation 7 Pre Rec F1 Pre Rec F1
LSTM 63.68 56.69 59.98 57.98 48.05 52.55
Transformer 65.32 60.39 62.76 59.97 54.45 57.08
BERT 50.28 49.17 49.72 46.44 43.73 45.05
ALBERT 70.91 55.49 62.26 68.45 53.18 59.86
embedding. We consider the original BERT [13] and the state-of-
the-art ALBERT [35]. We use mean pooling of the hidden token
representations as the sentence embedding as described in Sec-
tion 2.1.
Evaluation metrics. As the goal of inversion is to recover the
set of words in the sensitive inputs, we evaluate our inversion
methods based on precision (the percentage of recovered words
in the target inputs), recall (the percentage of words in the target
inputs are predicted) and F1 score which is the harmonic mean
between precision and recall.
White-box inversion setup. We evaluate the white-box inver-
sion with Equation 5 and Equation 7. For inversion with Equation 5,
we set the temperature T to be 0.05. For inversion with Equation 7,
we set the L1 penalty coefficient λsp to be 0.1 and the sparsity thresh-
old τsp to be 0.01. For both methods, we use Adam optimizer [32]
for gradient descent with learning rate set to 0.001. The hyper-
parameters are tuned on a subset of the adversary’s auxiliary data.
White-box inversion results. Table 1 summarizes the results.
Note that there is no cross domain results for Equation 5 since no
learning is needed. For inversion with Equation 5, an adversary can
extract more than a half and a third of the target input from LSTM
and Transformer embedding models respectively as indicate by
the F1 score. This method performs poorly on BERT and ALBERT
models. One plausible reason is that with manymore layers in BERT
where higher layer embeddings are more abstract than lower layers,
directly optimizing for the highest layer could lead to recovering
synonyms or semantically-related words rather than the targets.
For inversions with Equation 7, all performance scores increase
from Equation 5 on all models. We can recover more than half of
the input texts on nearly all models. We also notice that there is
only a little loss in performance when using cross-domain data for
training the mappingM .
We further investigate the performance of inverting embeddings
from different layers in BERT and ALBERT as shown in Figure 2.
There are in total 12 Transformer layers in BERT and ALBERT mod-
els and we choose embeddings from 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 layer for inver-
sion.We also compare with inverting from layer 0, i.e. mean-pooling
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Figure 2: Performance of embedding inversion on sentence
embedding from different layers of BERT and ALBERT. Pre
denotes precision and Rec denotes recall. The x-axis is the
layer index denoting which layer the embeddings are com-
puted. Index 0 is the lowest (bottom) layer and 12 is the high-
est (top) layer.
Table 2: Black-box inversion results on sentence embed-
dings. Pre denotes precision andRec denotes recall. The best
results are in bold.
Same domain Cross domain
LMLC Pre Rec F1 Pre Rec F1
LSTM 90.53 39.35 54.86 87.71 32.91 47.86
Transformer 81.18 26.07 39.47 77.34 21.82 34.04
BERT 89.70 36.80 52.19 84.05 30.28 44.52
ALBERT 95.92 48.71 64.61 92.51 44.30 59.91
LMSP Pre Rec F1 Pre Rec F1
LSTM 61.69 64.40 63.02 59.52 62.20 60.83
Transformer 53.59 55.72 54.63 51.37 52.78 52.07
BERT 60.21 59.31 59.76 55.18 55.44 55.31
ALBERT 76.77 72.05 74.33 74.07 70.66 72.32
of word embedding in BERT models. The performance drops dras-
tically when the layer goes high when inverting with Equation 5.
When training a mapping M and inverting with Equation 7, the
drop in the performance is much less significant for higher layers.
Black-box setup. We evaluate the black-box inversionwithLMLC
(Equation 8) and LMSP (Equation 9). For LMLC, we train |V| binary
classifiers as ϒ for each w ∈ V . For LMSP, we train a one-layer
LSTM as ϒ with number of hidden units set to 300. We train both
models for 30 epochs with Adam optimizer and set learning rate to
0.001, batch size to 256.
Black-box results. Table 2 summarizes the results. Inversion with
LMLC can achieve high precision with low recall. This might be
due to the inversion model ϒ being biased towards the auxiliary
data and thus confident in predicting some words while not others.
Inversion with LMSP yields better balance precision and recall and
thus higher F1 scores.
6.3 Sensitive Attribute Inference
Target and auxiliary data. We consider authorship of sentence
to be the sensitive attribute and target data to be a collection of
sentences of randomly sampled author set S from the held-out
dataset of BookCorpus, with 250 sentences per author. The goal
is to classify authorship s of sentences amongst S given sentence
embeddings. For auxiliary data, we consider 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50
labeled sentences (disjoint from those in the target dataset) per
author. We also vary the size of author set |S| = 100, 200, 400 and
800 where the inference task becomes harder as |S| increases.
Baseline model. To demonstrate sensitive attribute leakage from
the embedding vector, we compare the attack performance be-
tween embedding models and a baseline model that is trained
from raw sentences without access to the embeddings. We train
a TextCNN model [31] as the baseline, which is efficient to train
and has been shown to achieve accurate authorship attribution in
previous works [59, 65].
Additional embedding models. As discussed in Section 4, the
embedding models trained with dual-encoder and contrastive learn-
ing that is a focus of this paper might, in particular, favor attribute
inference. We compare the dual-encoder embedding models with
two other embedding models trained with different objective func-
tions. The first is the Skip-thought embedding model [33] which
is trained to generate the context given a sentence. We also evalu-
ate on InferSent embeddings [10] that is trained with supervised
natural language inference tasks.
Setup. For the baseline TextCNN model, we set the number of fil-
ters in convolutional layer to 128. For all other embedding models,
we train a linear classifier for authorship inference. We train all
inference models for 30 epochs with Adam optimizer and set learn-
ing rate to 0.001 and batch size to 128. We repeat each experiment
5 times with sampled S using different random seed and report the
averaged top-5 accuracy.
Results. Figure 3 demonstrates the results of authorship infer-
ence with different number of labeled data and different number of
authors. The baseline TextCNN models trained from scratch with
limited labeled data have the worst performance across all settings.
Skip-thought and InferSent embeddings can outperform TextCNN
but the gap between the performance decreases as the number of la-
beled examples increase. The LSTM and Transformer dual-encoder
models achieve best inference results and are better than the base-
line by a significant margin in all scenarios. This demonstrates that
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Figure 3: Performance of sensitive attribute (author) infer-
ence with different models. For the left figure, the x-axis is
the number of labeled data per author Ns and the y-axis is
the top-5 accuracy of classifying 100 authors. For the right
figure, the x-axis is the number of author classes |S| and the
y-axis is the top-5 accuracy with 50 labeled data per author.
embeddings from dual-encoder models trained with contrastive
learning framework [63] aid attribute inference attacks the most
comparing to other pre-trained embeddings.
6.4 Membership Inference
Evaluation metrics. We consider membership inference as a bi-
nary classification task of distinguishingmembers and non-members
of training data. We evaluate the performance of membership in-
ference attacks with adversarial advantage [77], defined as the
difference between the true and false positive rate. Random guesses
offer an advantage of 0.
Word embedding setup. We evaluate membership inference at-
tacks on sliding window of 5 words from Wikipedia articles. We
also perform the attack separately for windows with central words
having different frequencies, following the intuition that rare words
are prone to more memorization [67]. Specifically, we evaluate the
attack for windows with frequency of central words in decile (10th,
... , 90th percentile) ranges. We use cosine similarity for π .
Word embedding results. Figure 4 demonstrates the results. For
frequent (10th percentile) central words, there is almost no mem-
orization (advantage < 0.1). As this frequency decreases, the ad-
vantage increases correspondingly to roughly 0.3. FastText is most
resistant to these attacks possibly due to its operating on sub-word
units rather than exact words.
Sentence embedding setup. We evaluate membership inference
attacks on context- and aggregate-level data from the BookCorpus
dataset. We consider a pair of sentences for context-level data, and
a collection of sentences from the same book for aggregate-level
data with a goal of inferring if the book is part of the training
corpus. As with word embeddings, we evaluate the attack on dif-
ferent frequencies (averaged across words in a sentence). We use
dot-product similarity for π , and for learning-based similarity, we
learn a projection matrix with 10% of training and hold-out data.
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Figure 4: Performance of membership inference attack on
Word2Vec, FastText and GloVe. The x-axis is the inverse fre-
quency percentile range (the smaller themore frequent) and
the y-axis is the adversarial advantage.
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Figure 5: Performance of context-level (ctx) and book-
level membership inference attack on sentence embedding
trained with LSTM and Transformer. The x-axis is the in-
verse frequency percentile range (the smaller the more fre-
quent) and the y-axis is the adversarial advantage. The ctx′
and book′ denote results with learned similarity
We optimize LMIA with the Adam optimizer for 10 epochs with
learning rate set to 0.001.
Sentence embedding results. Figure 5 shows the results of MIA
on embeddings from LSTM and Transformer dual-encoder models.
For both models, context-level MIA advantage scores are below 0.1
for all frequency ranges, indicating that adversarial does not gain
much information about context-level membership from the em-
beddings. Learning based similarity can improve context-level MIA
slightly. For aggregated book-level inference, adversaries achieve a
greater advantage than context-level inference and learning-based
similarity scores can boost the advantage to 0.3 for books with
infrequent sentences.
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Figure 6: Effects of adversarial training against embedding
inversion on the utility (top row) and the inversion F1 score
(bottom row) for sentence embeddings trained with LSTM
and Transformer.
7 DEFENSES
Adversarial training. Attacks involving embedding inversions
and sensitive attributes are both inference-time attacks that wish to
infer information about the sensitive inputs given the output of the
embedding. A common defence mechanism for such inference-time
attacks is adversarial training [9, 17, 18, 38, 74]. In this framework, a
simulated adversaryA is trained to infer any sensitive information
jointly with a main model Φ while Φ is trained to maximize the
adversary’s loss and minimize the primary learning objective. The
embeddings trained with this minimax optimization protects sen-
sitive information from an inference-time adversary to an extent
while maintaining their utility for downstream tasks.
To defend against embedding inversion attacks, A is trained to
predict the words in x given Φ(x). For a pair of sentences in context
(xa ,xb ) and a set of negative example Xneg, the training objective
for Φ is:
min
Φ
max
A
λw log PA (W(xb )|Φ(xb )) − log PΦ(xb |xa ,Xneg),
whereW(x) is the set of words in x and the coefficient λw controls
the balance between the two terms. A natural choice for log PA
is to use the multi-label classification loss LMLC in Equation 8. To
defend against sensitive attribute attacks, A is trained to predict
the sensitive attribute s in x from the embedding Φ(x). As above,
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Figure 7: Effects of adversarial training against sensitive at-
tribute inference on the utility (top row) and the author clas-
sification top-5 accuracy (bottom row) for sentence embed-
dings trained with LSTM and Transformer. Ns denotes num-
ber of labeled data per author.
the training objective for Φ is:
min
Φ
max
A
λs log PA (s |Φ(xb )) − log PΦ(xb |xa ,Xneg),
where the coefficient λs controls the balance between the two terms.
Both minimax training objectives can be efficiently optimized with
the gradient reversal trick [20].
Results with adversarial training. We evaluate this adversarial
training approach on dual-encoder models with LSTM and Trans-
former. We keep all the training hyper-parameters the same as in
Section 6.1. We train multiple models under different λw and λs
and evaluate their effects on attack performance as well as utility
scores for downstream tasks. For utility measurement, we evaluate
the adversarially trained embeddings on four sentence analysis
benchmarks: multi-perspective question answering (MPQA) [73],
text retrieval (TREC) [37], subjectivity analysis (SUBJ) [52] and
Microsoft Research paraphrase corpus (MSRP) [14]. We treat all
benchmarks as classification problem and train a logistic regression
model for each task following previous works [33, 39].
Figure 6 shows the results for adversarial training against in-
version. As λw increases, the adversary performance drops for all
models. White-box inversion attacks drop most significantly. LSTM
embedding models needs a larger λw than Transformer models to
achieve similar mitigation, possible due to the fact that Transformer
models have more capacity and are more capable of learning two
tasks. Utility scores on the benchmarks drop more drastically on
embedding models using LSTM than Transformer due to the larger
value of λw .
Figure 7 shows the results for adversarial training against au-
thorship inference. As λs increases, the adversary performance on
inferring authorship drops significantly for both inference attack
models trained with 10 and 50 labeled data per author. Nearly all
utility scores on the four benchmarks remain rather stable for dif-
ferent λs ’s. This also demonstrates that different adversary tasks
can have different impact on the utility of embeddings. In our case,
removing input word information from embeddings is a harder task
than removing authorship and thus will have a larger impact on
the utility.
8 RELATEDWORK
Privacy in deep representations. Prior works demonstrate that
representations from supervised learning models leak sensitive
attributes about input data that are statistically uncorrelated with
the learning task [68], and gradient updates in collaborative training
(which depend on hidden representations of training inputs) also
leak sensitive attributes [45]. In contrast, this work focuses on
leakage in unsupervised text embedding models and considers
leakage of both sensitive attributes and raw input text. In addition,
we consider a more realistic scenario where the labeled data is
limited for measuring sensitive attributes leakage which is not
evaluated in prior works.
Recently and concurrently with this work, Pan et al. [51] also
considered the privacy risks of general purpose language models
and analyzed model inversion attacks on these models. Our work
presents and develops a taxonomy of attacks, which is broader in
scope than their work. Our work on inversion also assumes no
structures or patterns in input text, which is the main focus of
their work, and our work shows that we still recover substantial
portion of input data. Additional structural assumptions will lead
to a higher recovery rate as is shown in their work.
There is a large body of research on learning privacy-preserving
deep representations in supervised models. One popular approach
is through adversarial training [17, 74] as detailed in Section 7. The
same approach as been applied in NLP models to remove sensi-
tive attributes from the representation for privacy or fairness con-
cern [9, 18, 38]. Another approach for removing sensitive attributes
is through directly minimizing the mutual information between the
sensitive attributes and the deep representations [47, 50]. We adopt
the adversarial training approach during training embedding mod-
els as defense against embedding inversion and sensitive attribute
inference attacks.
Inverting deep representations. In computer vision community,
inverting deep image representation has been studied as a way for
understanding and visualizing traditional image feature extractor
and deep convolutional neural networks. Both optimization-based
approach [41, 69] and learning-based approach [15, 16] as been
proposed for inverting image representations. In contrast, we fo-
cus on text domain data which is drastically different than image
domain data. Text data are discrete and sparse in nature while im-
ages are often considered as continuous and dense. Our proposed
inversion methods are tailored for unsupervised text embedding
models trained with recurrent neural networks and Transformers.
Model inversion attacks [19] use gradient based method to re-
construct the input data given a classifier model and a class label.
The reconstruction is often a class representatives from the training
data, e.g. averaged face images of female for a gender classifier [45].
Embedding inversion, on the other hand, takes the representation
vector as input and reconstruct the exact raw input text.
Membership inference andmemorization. Membership infer-
ence attacks (MIA) have first been studied against black-box super-
vised classification models [66], and later on generative models and
language models [23, 67]. MIA is closely connected to generaliza-
tion where overfitted models are prone to the attacks [77]. In this
work, we extended the study of MIA to unsupervised word and sen-
tence embedding models without a clear notion of generalization
for such models.
It has been shown that deep learning models have a tendency
to memorize [78]. Later work showed that adversaries can extract
formatted training text from the output of text generation mod-
els [4], indicating a real privacy threat caused by memorization. In
this work, we focus on embedding models where the output is an
embedding vector without the possibility of extract training data
directly from the output as in text generation models. Instead, we
demonstrated how to measure the memorization in embeddings
through MIA.
Differential Privacy. Differentially-private (DP) training of ML
models [1, 44] involves clipping and adding noise to instance-level
gradients and is designed to train a model to prevent it from mem-
orizing training data or being susceptible to MIA. DP, which limits
how sensitive the model is to a training example does not provide a
defense against attacks that aim to infer sensitive attributes (which
is an aggregate property of training data). The noisy training tech-
niques are challenging for models with large parameters on large
amounts of data and sensitive to the hyper-parameters [53]. Our
embeddings, with over 10 million parameters in the word embed-
ding matrices V make DP training and hyper-parameter tuning
computationally infeasible. Therefore, we leave it to future work to
explore how to efficiently train embeddings with DP.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed several attacks against embedding mod-
els exploring different aspects of their privacy. We showed that
embedding vectors of sentences can be inverted back to the words
in the sentences with high precision and recall, and can also re-
veal the authorship of the sentences with a few labeled examples.
Embedding models can also leak moderate amount of membership
information for infrequent data by using similarity scores from
embedding vectors in context. We finally proposed defenses against
the information leakage using adversarial training and partially
mitigated the attacks at the cost of minor decrease in utility.
Given their enormous popularity and success, our results strongly
motivate the need for caution and further research. Embeddings not
only encode useful semantics of unlabeled data but often sensitive
information about input data that might be exfiltrated in various
ways. When the inputs are sensitive, embeddings should not be
treated as simply “vectors of real numbers.”
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